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Abstract 
Spectrum allocation is once more a key issue facing the global telecommunications industry. 
Largely overlooked in current debates, however, is the World Radiocommunication Conference 
(WRC).  Decisions taken by WRC shape the future roadmap of the telecommunications industry, 
not least because it has the ability to shape the global spectrum allocation framework. In the 
debates of WRC-12 it is possible to identify three main issues: enhancement of the international 
spectrum regulatory framework, regulatory measures required to introduce Cognitive Radio 
Systems (CRS) technologies; and, additional spectrum allocation to mobile service.  
WRC-12 eventually decided not to change the current international radio regulations with 
regard to the first two issues and agreed to the third issue. The main implications of WRC-12 on 
the spectrum ecosystem are that most of actors are not in support of the concept of spectrum 
flexibility associated with trading and that the concept of spectrum open access is not under 
consideration. This is explained by the observation that spectrum trading and spectrum commons 
weaken state control over spectrum and challenge the main principles and norms of the 
international spectrum management regime. In addition, the mobile allocation issue has shown 
the lack of conformity with the main rules of the regime: regional spectrum allocation in the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) three regions, and the resistance to the slow 
decision making procedures. In conclusion, while the rules and decision-making procedures of 
the international spectrum management regime were challenged in the WRC-12, the main 
principles and norms are still accepted by the majority of countries. 
Keywords:  WRC-12, cognitive radio, trading, spectrum policy, ITU. 
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1. Introduction 
A spectrum divide has emerged in which there is shortage in radio spectrum, a critical 
component in the delivery of wireless services. The spectrum divide is a direct consequence of 
the inefficient ‘command and control’ spectrum management regime that focuses mainly on 
technical aspects such as avoiding interference while creating an artificial scarcity of spectrum 
due to inefficient utilisation (Wellenius and Neto, 2005). 
The literature suggests two alternatives regimes to overcome such deficiencies. The first 
one, 'spectrum trading’ calls for treating spectrum assignments in a similar way to other property 
rights and allowing spectrum usage flexibility so that service and technology neutrality occur 
(Coase, 1959; Hazlett, 1998). Once spectrum property rights are defined, trading is then applied 
to capture the inherent economic efficiency of the market (Cave and Webb, 2003). The second 
regime, ‘spectrum commons’ is based on technologies such as cognitive radio systems (CRS) 
that enable spectrum open access to all users and as a result render license exclusivity and 
spectrum scarcity obsolete (Baran, 1995; Benkler, 1998; Gilder, 1994; Noam, 1995; Noam, 
1998). Commons advocates argue that spectrum should be managed in a decentralized way, with 
the regulator focusing on regulating equipment use and controlling traffic rather than spectrum. 
With this in mind, this paper focuses on the ITU WRC-12 meeting that was held in 
Switzerland at the start of 2012. This meeting was convened to discuss how the spectrum 
management framework could be enhanced as well as measures to introduce CRS and additional 
spectrum allocation to the mobile service. The remainder of this paper is divided into six main 
sections. In the following main sections, the international spectrum management regime is 
analysed (Section 2) and the spectrum ecosystem is outlined in terms of key actors, relations and 
changes in Section 3. This is then followed in Section 4 by a brief description of three key areas 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2032023
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debated at WRC-12, before Section 5 explores the implications of these debates for the spectrum 
ecosystem. A discussion is being drawn in Section 6 while concluding remarks are provided in 
Section 7. 
2. International Spectrum Management Regime 
Radio spectrum was perceived in the early days of wireless communications as a new 
inexhaustible natural resource commonly and freely used by the public (Struzak, 2003). However, 
two issues necessitated managing the spectrum at the national and international levels. The first 
of these is the phenomena of interference, which became a major problem as radios transmitted 
over a wide band of frequencies and radio emissions crossed frontiers. This caused interference 
in neighbouring countries. The second issue was the refusal of the Marconi company to relay 
messages received from competing operators (Anker and Lemstra, 2011). These two issues 
encouraged a shift in how spectrum was perceived, from a commodity to a natural resource 
whose usage needed to be managed (Kruse, 2002). Accordingly, an international conference was 
held in Berlin in 1903 to address the Marconi company monopoly over radio telegraphy and to 
enable international interconnection (Codding, 1991). The final protocol of the conference 
established that wireless stations should operate in a way as not to interfere with other stations 
(Codding and Rutkowski, 1982). Following that, the interest of many entities, such as military 
and broadcasters, in spectrum started to grow, which, in turn, motivated governments to heavily 
regulate spectrum usage (Ryan, 2012). This was in line with the national policies at the turn of 
the twentieth century which sought to enforce government control over radio spectrum for 
political purposes such as national security and for economic benefits derived from controlling 
the industry (Cowhey, 1990). 
  4
By the mid-1920s, the issue of harmful interference became more serious as Europe and 
North America were full of broadcasting stations using unregulated frequencies (Savage, 1989). 
Accordingly, the 1927 International Radiotelegraph Conference witnessed shift from focusing on 
the regulation of the radio traffic towards allocating the spectrum to separate services (Woolley, 
1995), and the concept of “common use of common frequencies” was gathering more 
momentum (Levin, 1971). The main principles of the international spectrum management 
regime1 are the sovereign right of each state to assign its frequencies to any service or station 
(Lyall, 2011), and that all radio stations must not cause harmful interference to other stations 
which operate in accordance with the provisions of the ITU radio regulations  (ITU-R, 2008e). 
The main norm of the regime is global harmonization of spectrum allocation. The radio sector of 
the ITU (ITU-R) is the administrative cooperation body responsible for setting the regime’s rules 
through the radio regulations and the ITU-R resolutions, recommendations and reports. The radio 
regulations have international treaty status and they are binding for all the ITU-R countries 
(Maitra, 2004).  
The regime’s rules include registering national frequencies in the ITU-R Master 
International Frequency Register (MIFR) in order to acquire international recognition and 
protection against harmful interference. Such registration requires conformity with the ITU-R 
service allocation table and not causing harmful interference to existing assignments in other 
countries (Lyall, 2011). A second rule is that allocating each spectrum band to one or more radio 
services with equal or different rights (primary and secondary). This is based on the results of 
compatibility and sharing studies that are usually technology dependent (Louis, 2011). Stations 
                                                        
1 Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles (beliefs of facts, causation, and rectitude), norms 
(standards of behaviour defined as rights and obligations), rules (specific prescriptions and proscriptions for action), 
and decision-making procedures (prevailing practices for making / implementing collective choices) around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations (Krasner, 1982). 
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of a secondary service cannot cause harmful interference to stations of primary services and 
cannot claim protection from harmful interference caused by stations of a primary service (ITU-
R, 2008c). A third rule is that of regional allocation, where the ITU divides the world into three 
regions in terms of spectrum allocation2.  
3. Spectrum Ecosystem  
By outlining the ‘spectrum ecosystem’ we aim to understand the complex set of relationships and 
interactions between actors and perspectives within the international spectrum policy domain. 
Adopting such an approach enables us to examine the factors that formulise the decision making 
process. As noted by Fransman (2010), the ecosystem metaphor is useful in understanding 
dynamic processes that accommodate different interacting forces.  
An ecosystem refers to an environment where the interacting actors benefit from each 
other’s participation via symbiotic 3  relationships (Sardenberg, 2010). The elements of an 
ecosystem are divided into biotic components, which include operators, manufacturers and end 
users, and abiotic components which refer to the environment including economic factors and 
political situation (Yuncuia and Gangb, 2011). Actors within the ecosystem conduct maintenance 
to their living environment while the environment promote their survival and development 
(Dong et al., 2007).  
The rules of actor interactions in the ecosystem are determined by institutions, which 
include financial institutions, regulators, competition authorities and standardization bodies 
(Fransman, 2010). The interaction between the different actors is influenced by the platform at 
                                                        
2 Region 1 comprises Europe, Africa, the Middle East west of the Persian Gulf including Iraq, the former Soviet 
Union and Mongolia. Region 2 covers the Americas, Greenland and some of the eastern Pacific Islands. Region 3 
contains most of non-former-Soviet-Union Asia, east of and including Iran, and most of Oceania. 
3 The word ‘symbiosis’ comes from the Greek meaning living together. 
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the heart of the ecosystem. Industry platforms are defined as the building blocks that act as a 
foundation upon which an array of firms can develop complementary products, technologies or 
services (Gawer, 2010). In our case, the main platform on which the ecosystem is based is radio 
spectrum.  
The spectrum ecosystem could be mapped onto four main layers: applications, 
technologies, frequency assignments and service allocations. These layers accommodate four 
main actors respectively: end users, the wireless telecommunication industry (e.g., manufactures 
and operators), national regulators, and the ITU-R. The main trigger for changes within the 
ecosystem is users’ demand to a particular wireless application (e.g., mobile voice calling). This 
initiates three types of interaction in the technology layer to meet such demand and provide 
suitable technologies, namely, competition, cooperative symbiotic and learning (Fransman, 
2010).  
Within the frequency assignments layer, the national regulator authorises users the access 
to particular part of the spectrum under specified conditions according to the type of application 
(Cave et al., 2006). However, certainty over international spectrum allocation enable economies 
of scale in production (Cave, 2002). Therefore, the industry seeks through their national 
regulators, mostly from the developed countries, to secure their interest in the service allocation 
layer upon the results of discussion in WRCs.  
Within WRCs, four main aspects of the spectrum are discussed: type of service (e.g., 
fixed, mobile), type of access (primary and secondary), allocation geographical areas (globally 
or regionally), and technology characteristics (e.g., maximum transmitted power). The WRC 
decision-making process creates technical and operational certainty for new and existing users 
and maximizes the global harmonization of the spectrum resource (Abernathy, 2004). Developed 
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countries lead the discussion in the ITU-R and tend to influence the developing countries’ 
position to achieve global or regional spectrum allocation. Most of the developing countries lack 
sufficiently knowledgeable and experienced staff to participate effectively in the discussions 
(McCormick, 2007).  
It should be noted that vertical integration has traditionally existed between the four 
layers, where users' applications are provided by one technology that operates in a particular 
frequency band assigned by national regulator. This band is allocated to a specific service by the 
ITU-R. Figure 1 maps the main layers and actors within the spectrum ecosystem. 
End Users
Applications
The Industry
Technologies
Lobby
Vertical 
Integration
National Regulators
Assignments
ITU-R
Demand
Allocations
Developing Deve
loped
Participation
Frequency Access Area Technology
Horizontal 
Integration
Indirect 
Influence
WRC
 
Figure 1: The Spectrum Ecosystem. 
 
Several factors have recently influenced the spectrum ecosystem and as a result altered its 
structure and dynamics. Firstly, there have been changes in the traditional vertical integration 
that existed between the four layers of the spectrum ecosystem. With regard to the applications 
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layer, the Internet’s IP platform has enabled the delivery of different types of applications on the 
same device (Melody et al., 2005). Moreover, it has led to the involvement of a new actor in the 
spectrum ecosystem, namely, over the top service provider. The technology layer has also 
witnessed convergence between the different technologies, where the same device could be used 
for applications categorised across different services (e.g., providing broadcasting and mobile 
services via UMTS technology) (Louis and Mallalieu, 2007). Measures such as spectrum re-
farming have enabled spectrum licensees to modify their frequency assignments in terms of 
changing the used technologies and end user’s applications (e.g., re-farming 2G spectrum to 
provide 3G applications) (El-Moghazi et al., 2008). Convergence in the service allocation layer 
occurs when the differences between hitherto standalone services become increasingly blurred  
(Louis and Mallalieu, 2007). All of those factors facilitate horizontal integration within each of 
the four layers and disassemble the vertical integration between them. 
The second change in the ecosystem is the increasingly prominent role of industry in the 
international spectrum management regime, especially since the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 
of 1995 formally recognised the rights of the private sector (MacLean, 1995). While the private 
sector has equal rights with national regulators in ITU-T and ITU-D, national regulators are the 
ultimate decision makers in the ITU-R (McCormick, 2007). However, the private sector 
participates and lobbies in the ITU-R to obtain support for their interests (Irion, 2009). For 
instance, the WIMAX forum lobbied many countries to include the WIMAX standard IEEE 
802.16-2009 to the ITU IMT-2000 radio interface (ITU, 2007). Furthermore, although national 
regulators are the decision makers for the treaty instruments in the WRCs, their decisions are 
developed based on the studies of the ITU-R study groups where the private sector conducts 
much of the technical work (McCormick, 2007). This indirect influence of the industry in the 
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ITU-R has resulted in multi-stakeholders spectrum governance based on reaching a consensus in 
which a large majority of those who participated agreed with one another (Waz and Weiser, 
2011).  
4. World Radiocommunication Conference 2012 
The WRC is one of the ITU conferences that consider specific radiocommunication matters. The 
WRC resolutions and recommendations are part of the RR and have international treaty status. 
Significantly, the agenda of the current conference is determined by the previous one. Items that 
could be included in the agenda include revisions to the RR and any other question of a 
worldwide character that falls within the remit of the conference (ITU, 2011b). During the WRC, 
negotiations are conducted between member states of the ITU, which effectively involving them 
trading support on different issues between one another (Manner, 2003). Observers that are 
sector members of the ITU-R, that is, from the private sector, can attend WRCs in a non-voting 
capacity, while each member state is entitled to one vote (ITU, 2011b). Regional organizations 
usually present common proposal to the WRC on behalf on their member states. In general, those 
countries that do not share the view of the others regarding a WRC decision are expected to 
agree to the opinion of the majority. Otherwise, they can record their reservations (Jakhu, 2000). 
With an attendance of approximately 3000 delegates from 153 national delegations and 
several companies and organizations with interest in global spectrum issues, WRC-12 discussed 
several issues critical for the telecommunications industry, namely: public protection and disaster 
relief, amateur radio and the usage of spectrum above 275 GHz (Clegg, 2012). More specifically, 
three main issues were discussed at the WRC-12:  
• Enhancement of the international spectrum regulatory framework; 
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• Regulatory measures required to introduce CRS technologies; and, 
• Additional spectrum allocation to mobile services. 
The following three sub-sections will elaborate on these issues in turn. 
4.1 International Spectrum Regulatory Framework 
WRC-12 discussed under agenda item 1.2 how to enhance the international spectrum regulatory 
framework (ITU-R, 2007a). The issue was first raised in 1989 as part of the move towards ITU 
restructuring in order to adapt to the changing telecommunications environment (Woolley, 1995). 
It was noted that radio regulations were complex, unwieldy and difficult to apply. Accordingly, 
WRC-95 recommended in recommendation 34 that future WRCs should, wherever possible, 
allocate frequency bands to the most broadly defined services with a view to providing the 
maximum flexibility to ITU countries in spectrum use. In addition, it was recommended that 
WRCs should, wherever possible, allocate frequency bands on a worldwide basis (ITU-R, 1995). 
The issue was also raised at WRC-03, motivated this time by the convergence of 
radiocommunications services as exemplified by services such as mobile-TV. More specifically, 
radio systems were perceived to have downstream and upstream channels that could operate 
within the same or different radio services (ITU-R, 2003a). During WRC-03, the European 
countries called for measures to be developed to facilitate the use of common, worldwide, 
frequency bands for implementing terrestrial wireless interactive multimedia applications to meet 
the convergence in radiocommunications services  (CEPT, 2003). In contrast, however, several 
countries and regional organisations explained that no regulatory impediments to terrestrial 
wireless interactive multimedia applications have been identified and, therefore, there is no need 
to study the issue in future WRCs (USA, 2003; ASMG, 2003).  
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Eventually WRC-03 decided that the existing regulatory framework contained sufficient 
flexibility to minimise any regulatory constrains resulting from the existing definitions of 
services (Gavrilov, 2003). However, WRC-03 also decided in resolution 951 to continue 
studying the effectiveness, appropriateness and impact of the radio regulations with regard to the 
advances in radio technologies and to identify options for improvements in radio regulations 
until WRC-07. The resolution considers that segregating bands for different radiocommunication 
services may not achieve the best possible result in terms of spectrum efficiency, and that the use 
of packet radio systems enables the provision of different applications within the same spectrum 
band. The resolution also considers that the same technology could be used in different 
radiocommunication services and the same applications could combine different elements of 
radiocommunication services (ITU-R, 2003b).  
The issue was not resolved at WRC-07, which decided to continue to study the issue until 
WRC-12 under agenda item 1.2 (ITU-R, 2007f). Following WRC-07, the ITU-R studies 
approached the issue from two perspectives. The first focused only on convergence between 
fixed and mobile services, while the second addressed spectrum allocation issues more generally 
(ITU-R, 2011b). Studies prior to WRC-12 show that, in most cases, there is joint allocation of 
spectrum across fixed and mobile services (ITU-R, 2011b) and that while the principle of 
frequency band allocation for broadly defined services is applied to 41.73 per cent of allocations, 
it is not always applicable (ITU-R, 2011a). 
During WRC-12 several regional organisations called for retaining the current practice 
with regard to spectrum allocation principles as there is sufficient flexibility within the existing 
regulatory framework and the WRC process does not impede the introduction of new 
technologies (APT, 2011a; ASMG, 2011a; RCC, 2011a; CITEL, 2012a). In contrast, European 
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countries proposed to upgrade recommendation 34 with regard to spectrum allocation principles 
so that it would become a resolution (CEPT, 2011a). WRC resolutions have a higher degree of 
obligation and are more binding on ITU countries than WRC recommendations. With regard to 
convergence between fixed and mobile services, only the Americans and European countries 
proposed to change some of the definitions within the radio regulations with regard to these 
services (CITEL, 2012a; CEPT, 2011a). 
Eventually WRC-12 decided not to change current spectrum allocation practices with 
regard to the two issues (ITU-R, 2012j), and to end the general studies of enhancing the 
international spectrum regulatory framework under resolution 951 as it has been considered by 
two successive conferences without being resolved (ITU-R, 2012f). Furthermore, WRC-12 
decided to continue the studies on revising the definitions of fixed service, fixed station and 
mobile station till WRC-15 (ITU-R, 2012g).  
In addition, the WRC-12 considered that that the issues raised by the convergence of 
services may not always be addressed through the redefinition of radiocommunication services 
and recommended that the ITU-R study all aspects of interference management for stations that 
may operate under more than one terrestrial radiocommunication service particularly cross-
border interference cases without being one of the agenda items for the WRC-15 (ITU-R, 2012c).  
4.2 Cognitive Radio Systems 
The second key issue that was discussed at WRC-12 under agenda item 1.19 were those 
regulatory measures that could enable deployment of CRS (ITU-R, 2007a). The issue was raised 
during WRC-07, which in resolution 956 invited the ITU-R to study measures such as the need 
for a worldwide harmonized cognitive supporting pilot channel (CPC) or a database that can 
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assist in the determination of local spectrum usage (ITU-R, 2007b). However, the interest in 
CPC had reduced following the WRC-07 (Ofcom, 2012b). 
During WRC-12 some concerns were expressed regarding interference between CRS and 
space, passive and safety services (RCC, 2011b). Countering this, however, others argued that 
national regulators can set operating parameters for CRS devices through equipment 
authorization requirements to ensure they will not cause interference (CITEL, 2012b; CEPT, 
2011b). Furthermore, several regional organizations called for the development of a WRC-12 
resolution to provide a framework for guidance on the study of CRS as well as guidance 
regarding how the use of CRS should be administered (ASMG, 2011b; ATU, 2011a; APT, 
2011b).   
In the end, WRC-12 did not decide on any particular measure with regard to CRS. No 
spectrum was allocated to CPC as it was recognised that CRS are technologies and not 
radiocommunication services. It was also agreed that the examination of the implementation and 
use of CRS in radiocommunication services should continue without the need for consideration 
in next WRC (ITU-R, 2012b). In addition, WRC-12 recommended that any radio system 
implementing CRS technology should operate in accordance with the provisions of the radio 
regulations and that the use of CRS does not exempt administrators from their obligations with 
regard to the protection others operating in accordance with the RR (ITU-R, 2012d).  
4.3 Mobile Allocation 
While the previous two issues were agenda items of WRC-12, allocating additional spectrum in 
the 694-790 MHz band for mobile service in ITU Region 1 countries was not. Nor, for that 
matter, had the issue been studied by ITU-R. This issue was discussed primarily due to the 
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pressure that arose from Arab and African countries calling for the global harmonization of the 
band. In other words, Arab and African countries were calling for the band to be allocated for 
mobile services in Region 1 as it was in ITU Regions 2 and 3 (Standeford, 2012b; Standeford, 
2012d). They called for an immediate allocation of spectrum in the 694-790 MHz band, which is 
already allocated to broadcasting service, to meet growing broadband demand. The issue was 
also discussed due to pressure from the mobile industry that lobbied regional organizations prior 
to WRC-12 (Billquist, 2010b; Billquist, 2010a). The origin of the issue is related to the ITU 
Regional Radio Conference in 2006 (RRC-06) which planned the band 470-862 for digital 
broadcasting, and to the WRC-07 which allocated the band 790-862 MHz for mobile service on a 
primary basis (Beutler, 2012).  
The argument presented by Arab and African countries was based on a number of points 
(ITU-R, 2012j). Firstly, the spectrum available in the 790-862 MHz band for mobile broadband 
is only the band 790-816 MHz as the rest of the band is already used by other services. Therefore, 
the 694-790 MHz band is, for Arab and African countries, arguably the first digital dividend 
rather than the second. Secondly, the 694-790 MHz band is already allocated in ITU regions 2 
and 3 for mobile and using this band will decrease the cost of deploying such systems. Thirdly, 
government income arising from allocating this band to broadband mobiles service will be used 
to facilitate the digital switchover; thereby enabling developing countries to meet the deadline 
date of 2015. Fourthly, the allocation would not affect broadcasting services as sharing between 
mobile and broadcasting services is possible. Finally, the propagation characteristics of the 694-
790 MHz band will contribute to reducing the digital divide between developing and developed 
countries.  
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The European countries opposed such proposals because the 694-790 MHz band is 
mainly allocated for broadcasting service in their territories and a large investment has already 
been made to fund the transition to digital television (Sims, 2012). In addition, it was argued that 
the issue is not a WRC-12 agenda item and had not been studied by ITU-R, and that some 
countries largely depend on terrestrial TV broadcasting due to the relatively low prevalence of 
cable broadcasting networks (RCC, 2012). 
WRC-12 decided eventually to allocate the 694-790 MHz frequency band in Region 1 to 
mobile service on a co-primary basis with broadcasting service. The allocation is effective 
immediately after WRC-15 upon refinement of the lower edge of the allocation (ITU-R, 2012h). 
In addition, the global growth in demand for mobile broadband applications has led to the 
inclusion of a new agenda item at the next WRC-15 that will consider additional spectrum 
allocations to the mobile service on a primary basis (ITU-R, 2012i). This new agenda item was 
supported by all of the six regional organizations (CEPT, 2011c; APT, 2011c; ATU, 2011b; 
ASMG, 2011c; CITEL, 2012c; RCC, 2011c). 
It is worth mentioning that several European countries recorded their reservations and 
stated that they agreed to reach a compromise with great reluctance, on an exceptional basis in 
the spirit of international cooperation and to satisfy the urgent demands of the African and Arab 
countries. They also stated that WRC-12 neither discussed nor clarified whether the proposals 
belonged to one of the agenda items of WRC-12 (Oberst, 2012).  
5. Implications for the Spectrum Ecosystem 
This section discusses the implications of decisions taken at WRC-12 for the spectrum 
ecosystem. The first sub-section discusses spectrum trading, while the second focuses on the 
notion of a spectrum commons. The third sub-section addresses mobile services. 
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5.1 Spectrum Trading 
In general, the principles underpinning the current international spectrum management regime 
have not been changed since the first Radio Telegraph Conference in Berlin in 1906 (ITU-R, 
2012c). WRC-12 witnessed the fourth attempt after WRC-95, WRC-03 and WRC-07 to amend 
the current international spectrum management regime and introduce more flexibility without 
any success. 
One possible explanation is that according to the ITU-R rules, countries applying service 
allocation flexibility cannot claim protection for their radio stations from harmful cross-border 
interference or cause harmful interference to stations operated in compliance with ITU radio 
regulations in other countries (ITU-R, 2008b). Meanwhile, according to article 42 of the ITU 
constitution member states have the right to make special arrangements on telecommunications 
matters as long as they do not cause harmful interference to the radio operations of other 
countries (ITU, 2011a).  
Therefore, although ITU radio regulations do not prevent national regulators from 
introducing flexibility, they do not encourage such approach. Moreover, unless there is 
significant benefit for the national regulators to introduce flexibility and adopt spectrum trading, 
they will not be willing to take the risk and lose international recognition to their spectrum 
assignments. The concept of spectrum full flexibility is quite difficult to be applied from the 
technical viewpoint as it implies defining generic technology and service models (Louis, 2011). 
This is against the traditional service allocation undertaken in the ITU that is made based on 
sharing or compatibility studies assuming some form of operational environment. Furthermore, 
the harmonization of spectrum allocation is important to minimize possible cross-border 
interference between neighbouring countries when they operate different services in the same 
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spectrum band. Coordination is less complicated when neighbouring countries operate the same 
service in the same spectrum band (Anker and Lemstra, 2011) 
In addition, the practice of trading in the countries that encourage market determination 
of service has not proven to be widely successful (Akalu and Arias, 2012; Benkler, 2011; Cave et 
al., 2007). For instance, the percentage of professional mobile radio (PMR) trading transactions 
in the UK, the country pioneering spectrum trading, compared to the total number of licenses is 
just 4.3 per cent, while in France, where there are 30,000 fixed link licenses and trading is 
allowed, no transaction has ever happened (Electronic Communications Committee (ECC), 
2011). 
This is due to the nature of wireless services that limits the effectiveness of flexible 
spectrum rights concept. More specifically, in services such as PMR there are a large number of 
licensees, each with a small band of spectrum. In such cases, the trading is part of merging or 
change of ownership. Secondly, in services such as point-to-point fixed link (microwave link), 
the spectrum license is customised to the licensee’s business. Therefore, it is critical to the 
licensee and of no importance to others. Thirdly, in the case of mobile operators, there are a 
small number of licensees with a large bandwidth of spectrum. Hence, the market is relatively 
stable and spectrum is a precious asset so that the number of trading transactions is almost zero.  
No new business opportunities are presented by flexibility. The IP platform of the 
Internet has enabled delivering different applications including data, video and voice. This 
renders the need for spectrum flexibility. The cellular mobile service becomes the main service 
for the end users and the last years has noticed a major trend in the ITU-R towards extending the 
spectrum available to mobile service by hundreds of megahertz (Chaduc and Pogorel, 2008).  
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It is argued that the main implication of the WRC-12 with regard to spectrum trading and 
flexibility is that it has affirmed that most of actors in the spectrum ecosystem are not in support 
of the concept as it does not provide them with any significant benefits that exceed the potential 
risks.  
5.2 Spectrum Commons 
The WRC-12 decision on CRS can be explained by the fact that if the conference decided to 
introduce specific regulatory measures with regard to CRS, this may engender calls for a similar 
approach for other emerging technologies. Therefore, it is argued that there was support not to 
change the radio regulations rather than to promote CRS. Accordingly, CRS were recognized as 
a collection of technologies that could enhance spectrum utilisation efficiency and provide 
additional flexibility within the current international spectrum management framework.  
It is also argued that the main reason for the WRC-12 decision was the recognition that 
deploying CRS in a country would not cause harmful interference in neighbouring countries as 
CRS are essentially used for short range applications (Sims, 2012). Moreover, while the decision 
of WRC-12 did not forbid CRS operations, it placed indirect restrictions on them by deciding 
that CRS must operate according to radio regulation provisions that are based on technologies 
that have static rather than dynamic operation parameters. More specifically, countries usually 
register those frequency assignments that may have international implications in the ITU-R 
database, MIFR, to obtain then appropriate international recognition (ITU-R, 2012a). However, 
such registration is required to include specific data such as frequency, location, service and 
transmitted power (ITU-R, 2008a). This data may not be predetermined in the case of CRS, with 
the result that CRS frequency assignments cannot be registered in the MIFR.  
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Interestingly, while most CRS advocates  previously advocated spectrum commons, 
during the CRS study period there was no support for CRS from either industry or academia. 
Among the 700 members in the ITU from the private sector, only a few are from academia4 (ITU, 
2012). Furthermore, the participation of IEEE, the leading standardization organization with 
regard to CRS, in the discussions within the ITU-R was quite limited5   (ITU-R, 2011c; ITU-R, 
2010b; ITU-R, 2010a; ITU-R, 2009a; ITU-R, 2009b; ITU-R, 2008d).  
The absence of direct support from telecom operators or national regulators is due to the 
fact that CRS challenge the existing wireless services market as they could alter the distribution 
of benefits from the spectrum resource between governments and service operators. On the one 
hand governments will not be able to capture the huge rents that have occurred in some countries 
from auctioning spectrum on an exclusive basis. On the other hand, CRS would enable private 
businesses to deploy their internal telecommunications network independently from the main 
operators’ network. Furthermore, vendors would be presented with the opportunity to gain a 
larger share of the profit to be found in the end user equipment market.  
Therefore, although WRC-12 recognised CRS as technologies that do not need any 
particular resolution in the radio regulations, previous WRCs have issued several resolutions and 
recommendations to support other technologies, such as IMT, under pressure from countries with 
a large manufacturing sector and the industry (ITU-R, 2007d, ITU-R, 2007e, ITU-R, 2007c).  
The WRC-12 decision could be considered as indirect support for the implementation of 
CRS because the alternative decision, to conduct band-by-band studies before using CRS, may 
                                                        
4 For instance, no university from the UK and only three universities from the USA are members in the ITU and thus 
can participate in its meetings. 
5 Among six meetings prior to the WRC-12, the IEEE participated only once in the 5th meeting. 
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require a future WRC agenda item for every band (Billquist, 2010c). This would delay the 
adoption of CRS technologies. In addition, it has been argued that the WRC-12 decision has 
given the go ahead for further consideration of industry proposal such as ‘Authorised Shared 
Access’ and regulatory approaches like ‘Licensed Shared Access’ that allow the dynamic overlay 
usage of the spectrum owned by mobile operators (Standeford, 2011; RSPG, 2011). It is worth 
noting that some regulators, such as the one in Ireland, plan to issue licences on a non-exclusive 
basis (Viola, 2012), and that the FCC plans to allow dynamic access not only in the TV bands 
but also in other licensed or unlicensed spectrum (Standeford, 2012c). 
Therefore, it is argued that the main implication of the WRC-12 with regard to spectrum 
commons is that it has given a clear signal that the concept of spectrum open access is not under 
consideration. However, the WRC-12 decision could promote the development and deployment 
of CRS technologies within the current international spectrum management regime. 
5.3 Mobile Service 
WRC-12 has clearly shown the dynamic interactions that occur between the various actors in the 
spectrum ecosystem. More specifically, although the European countries were against the Arab 
and African position at WRC-12, they are currently reconsidering their 700 MHz spectrum plans 
(Womersley, 2012b). The UK, for instance, planned to use the 700 MHz spectrum band for 
digital terrestrial TV (DTT) while allowing the use of white spaces technologies (Ofcom, 2012a). 
However, following the WRC-12 decision, the UK is currently considering utilizing the 600 
MHz as part of a frequency re-plan of the DTT platform after 700 MHz spectrum is released for 
mobile broadband (Ofcom, 2012a). Similar to the UK, the European countries have discussed 
several options for releasing 700 MHz for mobile broadband (Standeford, 2012a).  
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It is also expected that due WRC-12 African and Arab countries will re-plan their digital 
broadcasting spectrum so that they can use the upper part of the band currently allocated to 
broadcasting service for mobile services instead (Sims, 2012). Subsequent to WRC-12, calls 
have also been made to align mobile bands across all three ITU regions and to harmonise UHF 
frequencies internationally from 450 to 960 MHz (Womersley, 2012a). Other solutions include 
having a single platform of converged terrestrial operators that carry both wireless broadband 
traffic and broadcast media content (RSPG, 2012).  
However, while the WRC-12 decision has paved the way to a global harmonised 
spectrum in the 700MHz band, it has raised challenges with regard to harmonization of 
frequency arrangements between Asia (FDD in 700 MHz), Europe (FDD in 800 MHz), USA 
(FDD and TDD in 700 MHz), and Africa (Rancy, 2012). The WRC-12 decision has decreased 
the spectrum available for broadcasters by nearly 30% and will enforce them to utilize more 
spectrum-efficient technologies in the remaining UHF spectrum below 700 MHz (RSPG, 2012). 
WRC-12 has highlighted the increasing role of the developing countries in the ITU. For 
instance, Tariq Al Awadhi from the national regulator of the UAE was elected as the chairman of 
the conference (ITU-R, 2012k). The WRC-12 has also shown that the European countries are in 
a weak position in Region 1 as they do not have anymore a majority of the votes  (Beutler, 2012). 
Furthermore, organisations like the GSMA has become increasingly influential in the spectrum 
ecosystem due to their greater number of offices and more frequent meetings.  
It is, therefore, argued that the main implication of the WRC-12 with regard to mobile 
service is that it has shown how the behaviour of some actors in the spectrum ecosystem has an 
impact on the other actors. It has also shown the increasing direct and indirect influence of the 
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developing countries and the industry in the service allocation layer. WRC-12 has proved that 
the main driver for change in the spectrum ecosystem are business opportunities for the industry 
and the presence of clear benefits for national regulators. 
6. Discussion 
It can be argued that spectrum trading and spectrum commons advocates have not succeeded in 
creating a new paradigm that could reshape and influence the alternatives considered by the other 
actors in the spectrum ecosystem (Zarkin, 2006). More specifically, the benefits from adopting 
both regimes are not enough to change the traditional view of spectrum management for most of 
the world. The tipping point at which the regime could change will arguably be reached when 
entrepreneurs supporting appropriate behaviour in their community have persuaded a critical 
mass of states to change their views (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The move towards spectrum 
trading is encouraged mainly by national regulators in Europe as part of the telecommunications 
policy reform rather than by the industry (European Union, 2007). On the other hand, the notion 
of a ‘spectrum commons’ is mainly supported by academia and is largely unconsidered by 
national regulators. 
 Furthermore, from the regulatory viewpoint, trading and commons weaken state control 
over a valuable asset that has become a source of revenue in many countries. Both regimes 
threaten the main principles of the international spectrum management regime, namely, state 
control over spectrum and interference management. While trading transfers control over 
spectrum to the private sector via exclusive and flexible access, spectrum commons transfers 
control to end users via spectrum access etiquettes. Moreover, both regimes challenge the main 
norm of the regime which is global harmonization of spectrum allocation as trading enables full 
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flexibility and commons provides spectrum access on demand rather than through a fixed 
spectrum allocation (Marshall, 2010). The main rationale behind spectrum allocation is the 
management of interference between radio stations (Louis and Mallalieu, 2007). 
In general, WRC-12 has shown that there is great resistance from most of the ITU 
countries to any change in the international spectrum management regime’s principles or norms. 
However, WRC-12 has highlighted the lack of conformity with the main rule of the regime - the 
regional spectrum allocation within the ITU three regions. More specifically, while Arab and 
African countries are located in ITU region 1 along with European countries, the WRC-12 has 
witnessed the tendency of them to align themselves with Asian and American countries when it 
comes to the issue of allocating additional spectrum for mobile services in region 1. It is worth 
noting that  the ITU division of the world into three regions was due to a historical disagreement 
between the United States and Europe regarding spectrum allocation (Mazar, 2009) and because 
the ITU was dominated by the votes of the European countries and their colonies (Ryan, 2012).  
In addition to the decline of the ITU three regions, several countries criticised the slow 
decision making process of WRC which can take at least eight years when it comes to allocating 
new spectrum or adding new service to existing allocations. The pace of change in wireless 
telecommunication is accelerating and the growth of mobile data demand increasing. WRC-12 
recognised that there is a fairly long lead time between the identification of frequency bands by 
the WRCs and the deployment of systems in those bands (ITU-R, 2012e). The decision 
allocating  spectrum to mobile services in the 694-790 MHz band during WRC-12 without being 
one of the agenda items or studied beforehand was, to say the least, a significant challenge to the 
decision making procedures at play within the spectrum ecosystem.  
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Arab and African countries were motivated to challenge the normal decision making 
procedures by the frequently stated observation that mobile broadband has a positive impact on 
the economy (Rausas et al., 2011; LECG, 2009; The World Bank, 2009). Africa is also the 
fastest growing mobile market in the world (GSMA, 2012). Studies have shown that among the 
different policies that regulators can adopt, providing spectrum in the 700 MHz band can reduce 
the cost of providing mobile broadband by 40 to 50 per cent (Mckinsey & Company, 2009). 
Introducing mobile service allocation to the 694-790 MHz band in addition to the existing 
broadcasting service allocation is considered as facilitating partial spectrum flexibility. Hence, it 
is argued that spectrum ecosystem actors tend to adopt concept such flexibility in indirect ways if 
there are clear benefits. 
The role of international organizations has changed from being a reflector of the interests 
of countries and a forum for debate to an influence on the objectives and preferences of countries 
(Viotti and Kauppi, 2007). International regimes could play an interlocking role as they influence 
national policy preferences and integrate the preferences of the majority of countries as well as 
the singular interests of norm entrepreneurs (Ratto-Nielsen, 2006). Ryan (2012) argues that the 
ITU creates a cycle of regulatory lock-in, where national regulators are legally and culturally 
bound by the treaty-making nature of the ITU.  
The ITU is still the focal point for discussion of spectrum issues for many countries as it 
is the most inclusive international ICT governance forum (MacLean, 2003). Therefore, while the 
rules and decision-making procedures of the international spectrum management regime were 
challenged in the WRC-12, the main principles and norms are still accepted from the majority. 
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7. Conclusions 
In order to overcome the emerging spectrum divide resulting from deficiencies inherent to the 
current spectrum management regime, two alternatives have been discussed: spectrum trading 
and spectrum commons. While the former calls for allowing spectrum usage flexibility, the later 
promotes the concept of spectrum open access to all users. Meanwhile, national regulators have 
been heavily regulating spectrum usage, and the international spectrum management regime has 
been focusing on global harmonization of spectrum allocation. The main rational behind that is 
the management of interference between radio stations. 
The notion of a “spectrum ecosystem” enables us to understand the complex set of 
relationships and interactions between actors and perspectives within the international spectrum 
policy domain. The spectrum ecosystem can be divided into four main layers - applications, 
technologies, frequency assignments and service allocations - associated respectively with four 
main actors - end user, the industry, national regulators, and the ITU-R. Within the WRCs, four 
main aspects of the spectrum are discussed: type of service, type of access, allocation 
geographical areas and technology characteristics.  
WRC-12 discussed three main issues. The first issue that it discussed was enhancement 
of the international spectrum regulatory framework, while the second was the regulatory 
measures required to introduce CRS technologies. The third key issue that was discussed at 
WRC-12 was the allocation of additional spectrum allocation to mobile service. After much 
discussion, the WRC-12 decided not to change the current international radio regulations with 
regard to the first two issues and agreed to the third issue. 
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One possible explanation is that introducing flexibility is against the traditional service 
allocation ethos of the ITU-R and does not bring about new business opportunities for the 
industry. Furthermore, the WRC-12 decision on CRS can be explained by the fact that if the 
conference decided to introduce specific regulatory measures with regard to CRS, this may 
engender calls for a similar approach for other emerging technologies. On the other hand, the 
WRC-12 decision on mobile service has shown how the behaviour of some actors in the 
spectrum ecosystem has an impact on the other actors, and the increasing direct and indirect 
influence of the developing countries and the industry, respectively, in the ITU-R. 
It is argued that the main implications of WRC-12 on the spectrum ecosystem are that 
most of actors in the spectrum ecosystem do not support the concept of spectrum flexibility 
associated with trading, and that the concept of spectrum open access is not under consideration. 
In addition, the mobile allocation issue has proven that the main driver for change in the 
spectrum ecosystem are business opportunities for  industry and clear benefits for national 
regulators. 
The movement towards change in the international spectrum management regime is led 
by a minority of the spectrum ecosystem actors, and thus has not yet reached the point at which 
the regime could change. Resistance from most ITU countries to spectrum trading and spectrum 
commons is because both regimes weaken state control over spectrum and challenge the main 
principles and norms of the international spectrum management regime. Having said this, WRC-
12 highlighted the lack of conformity with the main rule of the regime - regional spectrum 
allocation in the ITU three regions - and  resistance to slow decision making procedures found 
within the ITU. In conclusion, while the rules and decision-making procedures of the 
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international spectrum management regime were challenged in the WRC-12, the main principles 
and norms are still accepted from the majority. 
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